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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN STONE, 
vs, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 17613 
GORDON BARTH STONE, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action based on the divorced husband's 
Petition for Modification of an original Divorce Decree by 
the reduction of alimony required to be paid by said appellant-
defendant husband to plaintiff-respondent wife. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower Court, the Honorable Dean Conder presiding, 
refused to reduce the amount of alimony required to be paid 
pursuant to the original Decree, and the defendant-appellant 
husband appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the judgment of the trial Court 
reversed, and to have this Court make an Order substantially 
reducing the amount of alimony to be paid by defendant-appellant 
husband to plaintiff-respondent wife. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent-wife and appellant-husband were marri~h 
February of 195 3, and as issue of said marriage had six chilG:, 
said marriage ending in divorce in January of 1976. That the 
original Decree of divorce provided for, among other things, 
the payment of alimony, child support and distribution of 
property between the parties. Said original Decree was~~ 
upon a Stipulation entered into by and between the parti~,~ 
both responde1,t and appellant were represented by counsel. 30 
respondent being represented by her brother and the brother·::. 
law of the appellant herein, and the appellant being represe.1' 
by the said Byron L. Stubbs. The parties were married for 
approximately 23 years prior to their divorce. 
In November of 1980, appellant-husband, by and throu~: 
his attorney, petitioned the lower Court to grant some relief 
to said appellant in the payme:-1t of alimony, and said appella: 
based his Petition for Reduction of Alimony on the following 
reasons: 
1. That the respondent's salary had increased since 
the date of said divorce over and above that which she was 
receiving at the time of the divorce in excess of 80 percent. 
2. That at the time of the divorce there were 5 
children living at home, and as of the date of the Petition 
only one minor child is living at home. 
3. The value of the real property has increas~ 5~ 
,, 
stantially from the date of the divorce Decree, and the ne,, 
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for such a large family home for the respondent to live in had 
ceased to exist. 
4. The appellant-husband has now remarried. 
5. The automatic increase in alimony of 35 percent of 
each raise received by the appellant-husband herein takes away 
said appellant-husband's incentive to excell in his work and 
discourages said respondent-wife from improving her financial 
condition. 
Following a hearing without the opportunity to offer 
any oral testimony, the Honorable Dean Conder dismissed appellant-
husband's Order to Show Cause and specifically found in his 
Memorandum Decision that an 85 percent increase in salary was 
an insufficient increase to justify a reduction in appellant-
husband's obligation to pay alimony, and apparently the lower 
Court ignored any and all other facts before it at the time as 
indicated by the Memorandum Decision. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
IS AN INCREASE IN INCOME SINCE THE DATE OF 
THE ORIGINAL DECREE WHICH IS IN EXCESS OF 
80 PERCENT OF THAT AMOUNT EARNED BY RESPONDENT-
WIFE AS OF THE DATE OF SAID ORIGINAL DECREE 
A SUFFICIENT INCREASE TO JUSTIFY A REDUCTION 
IN THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY REQUIRED TO BE PAID 
BY APPELLANT-HUSBAND PURSUANT TO THE ORIGINAL DECREE 
Respondent's 1979 tax return showed a total income of 
$13,881.98. Respondent's 1975 tax return shows a total income 
of $7,537.12. The total increase in income of respondent-
plaintiff in four years was $6,344.86. This total amounted 
to an increase in income of 84.18 percent over a four-year 
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sought relief from the payment of alimony was the fact that 
since the date of the Decree, five of the six children born 
as issue of the marriage and living with the plaintiff at the 
time of the original divorce Decree had since moved from the 
home of the parties where plaintiff-respondent resides. As 
a result thereof, the said plaintiff-respondent has much more 
free time in which she can earn a living than she did when 
all of children were living at home, her liabilities to furnish 
support and care for said children has certainly decreased, 
and her cost-of-living overall has obviously by reason of the 
fact that five children have moved out of the home gone down. 
The value of the real estate awarded to the plaintiff-
respondent herein as of the date of the original Decree has 
increased substantially and the need for such a large home for 
plaintiff and one child to reside in is presently nonexistent. 
Thevalue increase placed on the home granted plaintiff-respondent 
in the original Decree as indicated by the defendant-appellant 
on page 11, line 33, of said defendant-appellant's answer to 
plaintiff's Interrogatories wherein said appellant states at 
line 33, " ••. June, 1976, pursuant to the divorce Decree of 
March, 1976, plus a Quit-Claim Deed to Marilyn Stone. I re-
ceived nothing therefor, and the fair market value as to the 
said property as of December 2, 1980, would be approximately 
$100,000.00, said value being approximately $60,000.00 as of 
the date of the divorce Decree." Thus, the increase in the 
equity of the home has been approximately $40,000.00 since the 
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date of the divorce Decree. Also, as indicated at line 27 
' 
page 11, of defendant-appellant's Answers to respondent-
plaintiff' s Interrogatories, the size of said home is l,400 
sq. ft. with a full basement on approximately one acre of 
ground with two bedrooms finished in the basement prior to 
respondent-appellant's leaving said home. 
It is obvious that the respondent-plaintiff does not 
need such an elaborate, if not extra-large, place to reside 
in all by herself and that to do so places a s~bstantial 
burden upon both her and the defendant-appellant herein to 
support the same. 
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 Utah 2d 360, 438 P. 2dl! 
the Court stated as follows: 
"The fact that the wife owns property which 
has increased substantially in value or 
ability to produce income after the entry 
of the Decree for alimony is an important 
consideration as is the fact that a child 
whom the wife has been supporting has married 
and has become employed and self-supporting." 
One other factor that should have been considered by 
the lower Court, but was somewhat ignored by +:he same, was 
the fact that two of the young boys were supported (voluntari: 
on a Mission for the L.D.S. Church subsequent to thetimethi: 
they left the home of the plaintiff-respondent herein. Both, 
however, have since returned and neither party has any furth~ 
obligation therefor at the present time. 
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Note that on page 30, at line 20, of the deposition 
taken by the attorney for the respondent-plaintiff herein of 
Mr. Stone that he indicates that five children were living at 
home at the time of the original Decree in 1976, and on page 
31 of said deposition Mr. Stone indicates how the child support 
for the children was computed by the original Decree. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS REMARRIED SINCE THE 
DATE OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE AND HAS THE ADDED 
OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT HIS NEW SPOUSE AS WELL 
AS FURNISH PARTIAL SUPPORT TO TWO STEP-CHILDREN 
The defendant-appellant has since the date of the 
original Decree taken on the additional responsibility of a 
new wife as well as partial responsibility for the support and 
maintenance of two of said new wife's children. Said defendant-
appellant is aware of the fact that this is a self-inflicted 
disability which he has placed upon himself. However, said 
facts must be taken into consideration by the Court in order 
for said Court to make a proper and fair determination of the 
said respondent-appellant's total ability to pay the alimony 
required of him by the original Decree. In any event, the Court's 
attention is directed to the defendant-appellant's Affidavit 
filed with the lower court and being before you at the present 
time, said Affidavit being dated the 12th day of January, 1981, 
and given in support of his position for reduction of alimony 
to the lower court. Said Affidavit showing a comparison between 
his present expenses and the expenses which he had in 1976, 
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• 
wherein it is shown that in 1976 he had a total expense for 
the operation of his household affairs of $1,259.00, and in 
1979 said amount had increased to $1,999.00, an increase of 
$740.00 or an increase of 58.77 percent. If we look further 
at said same Affidavit of the said defendant-appellant herei: 
we find that his salary increased over the same period of~ 
only 34.86 percent. 
TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 35 PERCENT 
OF EACH INCREASE IN SALARY WHICH DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT RECEIVES IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 
AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE 
The original Decree grants to the plaintiff-responde:: 
an amount equal to 35 percent of the gross amount of each rai' 
received by the appellant-defendant from his employer oo~ 
job. Such a provision discourages the defendant-appellant's 
incentive to do a good job for his employer inasmuch as his 
salary increases are substantially eaten up by the increaser 
alimony and the taxes required to be ;oaid to the Federal and 
State Governments. Such a provision is contrary to most afr;· 
decrees wherein the amount of alimony awarded in the original 
Decree generally precedes in a declining manner and is grante; 
to the plaintiff only in an effort to help throughout the di!'.· 
period of reestablishing herself. Said period in the instant) 
is obviously past and there is no longer a need for alimony ai 
such, let alone an automatic increase in alimony, without sho'it 
any justification or reason therefor. 
It is true that the defendant-appellant had the advici 
't 
and counsel of his present attorney, Byron L. Stubbs, but 1 
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is also true, as indicated by said defendant-appellant's Affidavit 
filed with the lower Court and before you in this matter, that 
said defendant-appellant refused to take the advice of said 
counsel. I refer you to the defendant-appellant's Affidavit 
dated January 12, 1981, and refer you specifically to page 4 
thereof, paragraph 5, wherein said defendant-appellant indicates 
at line 14, "He did sign said agreement because his wife was 
being represented by her brother - lawyer, who had also been 
for a period of 22 years a trusted brother-in-law and counselor 
to the affiant herein." 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing brief and the files and records 
herein, the defendant-appellant is entitled to a substantial 
reduction in alimony based upon the numerous changes in cir-
cumstances which have occurred since the date of the original 
Decree, and the said lower Court erred when it failed to grant 
relief as requested by said defendant-appellant. 
ed, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
